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Cultural Cognition and Public Policy
Dan M. Kahan† and Donald Braman††

I. INTRODUCTION
Our concern in this Essay is to explain the epistemic origins of political
conflict. Citizens who agree that the proper object of law is to secure society’s
material well-being are still likely to disagree—intensely—about what policies
will achieve that end as an empirical matter. Does the death penalty deter
homicides, or instead inure people to lethal violence? Would stricter gun
control make society safer, by reducing the incidence of crime and gun
accidents, or less safe, by hampering the ability of individuals to defend
themselves from predation? What threatens our welfare more—environmental
pollution or the economic consequences of environmental protection laws?
What exacts a bigger toll on public health and productivity—the distribution of
street drugs or the massive incarceration of petty drug offenders?
At first glance, it might seem that such disagreement doesn’t really require
much explanation. Figuring out the empirical consequences of criminal,
environmental, and other regulatory laws is extremely complicated. Scientists
often disagree about such matters. Moreover, even when expert consensus
seems to emerge, it is based on highly technical forms of proof that most
members of the public can’t realistically be expected to understand, much less
verify for themselves. So citizens disagree about the empirical dimensions of
various public policy questions because conclusive information about the
consequences of such policies is either nonexistent or inaccessible to them.
But it turns out that this explanation is as simplistic as it is intuitive. If the
source of public dispute about the empirical consequences of public policy
were based on the indeterminacy or inaccessibility of scientific knowledge,
than we would expect beliefs about these consequences either to be randomly
distributed across the population or to be correlated with education. But this is
not so: Factual disagreement on matters such as the death penalty,
environmental protection laws, gun control and the like is highly polarized
across distinct social groups—racial, sexual, religious, regional, and
† Deputy Dean and Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
†† Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow, Yale Law School.
Research for this paper was funded by National Science Foundation Grant 0242106.
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ideological.1 Such divisions persist even after education is controlled for;
indeed, they have been shown to characterize differences of opinion even
among experts who specialize in the methods necessary for establishing the
empirical consequences of public policies.2
Moreover, were indeterminacy or inaccessibility of scientific knowledge
the source of public disagreement, we would expect beliefs on discrete issues to
be uncorrelated with each other. Accepting one empirical claim or another
about gun control, for example, doesn’t give someone more or less reason to
believe one position or another about global warming. Yet in fact, factual
beliefs on these and many other seemingly unrelated issues do cohere. If
someone believes that gun control doesn’t deter gun violence, he is very likely
to believe that global warming poses no serious environmental risk, and that
abortion clearly puts the health of women in danger; if she believes that gun
control does deter crime, she’s likely to think that global warming is a serious
problem, and that abortion isn’t dangerous to a woman’s health.3
Patterns like these don’t occur by chance. There is some phenomenon—
other than the paucity or inaccessibility of scientific information—that shapes
the distribution of factual beliefs about, and the existence of political conflict
over, law and public policy. What is it?
The answer, we propose, is a set of processes we call cultural cognition.
Essentially, cultural commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged
political issues. Culture is prior to facts, moreover, not just in the evaluative
sense that citizens might care more about how gun control, the death penalty,
environmental regulation and the like cohere with their cultural values than
they care about the consequences of those policies. Rather, culture is prior to
facts in the cognitive sense that what citizens believe about the empirical
consequences of those policies derives from their cultural worldviews. Based
on a variety of overlapping psychological mechanisms, individuals accept or
reject empirical claims about the consequences of controversial polices based
on their vision of a good society.
This account has important prescriptive as well as positive implications. If
one starts with the intuitive but mistaken premise that public disagreement is an

1. On the death penalty, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes:
Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994); and Samuel R. Gross, Update:
American Public Opinion on the Death PenaltyIt’s Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448
(1998). On environmental risk regulation, see PAUL SLOVIC, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science:
Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390-412 (2000). On gun control,
see TOM W. SMITH, 1999 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH
CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS (2000), http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/online/gunrpt.pdf.
2. See, e.g., SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 396.
3. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Gender, Race, and
Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety 15-24 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory
Research
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
86,
2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=723762.
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artifact of insufficient or insufficiently accessible scientific information, the
obvious strategy for dispelling disagreement, and for promoting enlightened
democratic decisionmaking, is to produce and disseminate sound information
as widely as possible. But the phenomenon of cultural cognition implies that
this strategy will be futile. In determining whether empirical information on
gun control, on the death penalty, on environmental regulation, on social
deviance, and the like is sound, individuals will inevitably be guided by their
cultural evaluations of these activities.
Our point isn’t that citizens behave duplicitously when they consider and
debate such issues. Rather, our argument is that cultural commitments operate
as a kind of heuristic in the rational processing of information on public policy
matters. Again, citizens aren’t in a position to figure out through personal
investigation whether the death penalty deters, gun control undermines public
safety, commerce threatens the environment, et cetera. They have to take the
word of those whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims, and
what sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible. The people they trust,
naturally, are the ones who share their values—and who as a result of this same
dynamic and others are predisposed to a particular view. As a result, even
citizens who earnestly consider empirical policy issues in an open-minded and
wholly instrumental way will align themselves into warring cultural factions.
Nothing in this account implies either that there is no empirical truth of the
matter on public policy issues or that citizens can’t ever be expected to see it.
But in order to persuade members of the public to accept empirically sound
information, it is necessary to do more than merely make such information
available to them. Like many other heuristics, the cultural cognition of public
policy can impede the rational processing of information. But like at least some
other heuristics, its influence can be neutralized with appropriate debiasing
techniques. The key to debiasing here is to frame empirical information in
terms that make assent to it compatible with, rather than antagonistic to, the
commitments of individuals of diverse cultural persuasions.
The remainder of this Essay expands on these claims. In Part II, we offer a
schematic overview of cultural cognition, identifying its foundations in
anthropology and social psychology. In Part III, we summarize existing
empirical evidence of the impact of cultural cognition. Part IV makes a short
detour, assessing how the phenomenon of cultural cognition relates to the
concepts of ideology and cultural political conflict. Parts V and VI examine the
normative and prescriptive implications of cultural cognition. And Part VII
concludes.
II. CULTURAL COGNITION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
By “the cultural cognition of public policy” (or simply “cultural
cognition”), we mean to refer to the psychological disposition of persons to
149
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conform their factual beliefs about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of
law to their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation. Our
hypothesis that individuals display such a disposition rests on the intersection
of two bodies of social science research, one in the field of anthropology and
the other in the field of social psychology.
The work in anthropology on which we draw is associated with Mary
Douglas. In her classic work Purity and Danger,4 Douglas traced the
identification of the idea of “pollution” with the “unholy” or immoral in
primitive religions. “[L]aws of nature,” she wrote, “are dragged in to sanction
the moral code.”5 Adultery, incest, the confusion of sexual functions and roles,
various acts of political disloyalty or disrespect for authority—all are viewed
not merely as impious but as dangerous. They naturally spawn the outbreak of
contagious disease within the community at large, the occurrence of
devastating natural disasters, the dampening of human fertility, and the like.
“[P]rimitives expect their rites to have external efficacy”6—they are committed
to the norms that regulate social orderings as much, if not more, for
“instrumental” reasons as for “expressive” ones.7
It is conventional to view this feature of primitive religions as a product of
the role that superstition necessarily plays in lieu of natural science within
premodern societies. But a second theme of Purity and Danger is that the
equation of pollution or danger with deviancy is no less present among modern
societies, a point Douglas famously established by showing how intertwined
our own conceptions of “dirt,” and our resulting sensibilities of revulsion and
disgust, are to the “contravention” of “ordered relations”:
Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table;
food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom, or
food bespattered on clothing; similarly, bathroom equipment in the drawing room;
clothing lying on chairs; out-door things in-doors; upstairs things downstairs; under8
clothing appearing where over-clothing should be . . . .

Our perception of what is “dirty,” and what thus poses a source of potentially
unhygienic and hazardous contamination, Douglas wrote, “is [a] reaction which
condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished
classifications.”9
This theme—that modern sensibilities and perceptions of danger are
artifacts of our commitment to distinctive cultural orderings—is even more
systematically developed in Douglas’s Risk and Culture,10 co-authored with

4. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER (1966).
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 58.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 35-36.
9. Id. at 36.
10. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
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political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. In that work, Douglas and Wildavsky rely
on a typology of cultural worldviews (developed elsewhere by Douglas11) that
classifies them along two dimensions, “group” and “grid.”
GRID
Hierarchist

GROUP

Individualist

Solidarist/Communitarian

Egalitarian

Figure 1. Douglas’s Culture Typology.
A “low group” worldview coheres with an individualistic social order, in which
individuals are expected to secure their own needs without collective
assistance, and in which individual interests enjoy immunity from regulation
aimed at securing collective interests. A “high group” worldview, in contrast,
supports a solidaristic or communitarian social order, in which collective needs
trump individual initiative, and in which society is expected to secure the
conditions of individual flourishing.12 A “high grid” worldview favors a
hierarchical society, in which resources, opportunities, duties, rights, political
offices and the like are distributed on the basis of conspicuous and largely fixed
social characteristics—gender, race, class, lineage. A “low grid” worldview
favors an egalitarian society, one that emphatically denies that social
characteristics should matter in how resources, opportunities, duties and the
like are distributed.13
11. MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 54-68 (1970).
12. See Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (S.
Krimsky & D. Goldin eds., 1992) (stating that “low group” worldviews expect individuals to “fend for
themselves and therefore tend to be competitive,” whereas “high group” worldviews assume that
individuals will “interact frequently . . . in a wide range of activities” in which they must “depend on one
another,” a condition that “promotes values of solidarity”).
13. See JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE 6 (1985) (stating that the
“high grid” worldview corresponds to hierarchical society in which resources, opportunities, respect and
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According to Douglas and Wildavsky, individuals select certain risks for
attention and disregard others in a way that reflects and reinforces the particular
worldviews to which they adhere. Egalitarians and solidarists are thus naturally
sensitive to environmental risk, the reduction of which justifies regulating
commercial activities that are productive of social inequality and that legitimize
unconstrained self-interest. Individualists predictably dismiss claims of
environmental risk as specious, in line with their commitment to the autonomy
of markets and other private orderings. So do hierarchists, who perceive
warnings of imminent environmental catastrophe as threatening the competence
of social and governmental elites.14 On its surface, conflict over environmental
regulation focuses on competing empirical claims of threats and dangers. But
because the positions people take reflect and reinforce their cultural
worldviews, disputes over environmental risks are in essence “the product of an
ongoing debate about the ideal society.”15
Douglas and Wildavsky offered plausible, if impressionistic, evidence that
individuals do form risk perceptions congenial to their cultural worldviews, but
they offer no systematic account of why. In Purity and Danger, Douglas
ventured a functionalist explanation: Belief that immoral behavior is also
dangerous “affords a means of supporting the accepted system of morality.”16
In subsequent works, both Wildavsky17 and Douglas18 have more
systematically pursued this line of argument, despite the low regard with which
functionalism is now held in the social sciences generally.19
But one needn’t be a functionalist to accept the relationship that Douglas
and Wildavsky posited between risk perception and cultural worldviews. Even
a hardcore methodological individualist—who insists that all human
institutions and states of affairs be linked to the decisions of self-interested
individuals—might expect to see such perceptions arrayed in a culturally
skewed pattern. Self-interested individuals need to figure out which activities,
courses of action, and states of affairs promote their interest. Social
psychology—the second body of research we draw on—suggests that cultural
values will play a large role in that process.20

the like are “distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications, such as sex, color, . . .
holding a bureaucratic office, [or] descent in a senior clan or lineage”); Rayner, supra note 12, at 87
(stating that the “low grid” worldview favors “an egalitarian state of affairs in which no one is
prevented from participating in any social role because he or she is the wrong sex, or is too old, or does
not have the right family connections,” and so forth).
14. See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 10, at 99-101.
15. Id. at 36.
16. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 133.
17. MICHAEL THOMPSON, RICHARD ELLIS & AARON WILDAVSKY, CULTURAL THEORY (1990).
18. MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986).
19. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 27-28 (1985).
20. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 176-80 (1998) (suggesting
“ideological” explanations of individual behavior can avoid functionalism through reliance on social
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Several overlapping psychological mechanisms are likely to induce
individuals to conform their beliefs about putatively dangerous activities to
their cultural evaluations of those activities. One is cognitive-dissonance
avoidance.21 It’s comforting to believe that what’s noble is also benign, and
what’s base dangerous.22 It’s not comforting—indeed, it’s psychically
disabling—to entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s harmful that
force one to renounce commitments and affiliations essential to one’s
identity.23
Affect is another mechanism that harnesses factual belief to cultural value.
Emotions play as large a role in individuals’ perceptions as any other faculty of
sensation or judgment.24 Perceptions of how harmful activities are, in
particular, are informed by the visceral reactions those activities trigger. And
whether those reactions are positive or negative is determined largely by
cultural values.25
Finally and most importantly, cultural orientations condition individuals’
beliefs about risk through a set of in-group/out-group dynamics. When faced
with conflicting claims and data, individuals usually aren’t in a position to
determine for themselves how large particular risks—leukemia from
contaminated groundwater, domestic attacks by terrorists, transmission of
AIDS from casual contact with infected gay men—really are. Instead, they
must rely on those whom they trust to tell them which risk claims are serious
and which specious. The people they trust, naturally enough, tend to be the
ones who share their worldviews—and who for that reason are likely biased
toward one conclusion or another by virtue of forces such as cognitivepsychological mechanisms); Raymond Boudon, Social Mechanisms Without Black Boxes, in SOCIAL
MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL THEORY 172 (P. Hedström & R. Swedberg eds.,
1998) (suggesting that social psychological mechanisms make ideological explanations of human
behavior compatible with “methodological individualism”).
21. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
22. Slovic, for example, has shown that perceptions of risk and benefit for risky technologies are
always inversely correlated, a finding suggesting that risk perceptions are influenced by cognitive
dissonance. See, e.g., SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 404-05; see also George A. Akerlof & William T.
Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982)
(suggesting that cognitive dissonance deflates demand of workers to be compensated for accepting
occupational risks).
23. See David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: SelfAffirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 4 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 119, 120
(2002) (“To the extent that information threatens self-worth, or is presented in a manner that threatens
self-worth, people may dismiss, deny, or distort in a fashion that serves to sustain their personal feelings
of adaptiveness and integrity.”); see also Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong:
Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497,
504 (1995) (“[B]elongingness can affect how people process information about nearly all categories of
stimuli in the social world”).
24. See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994) (showing that emotions are integral to reasoning, not opposed to it); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001) (defending a cognitive
conception that links emotions to cognitive appraisals of different goods and states of affairs).
25. See SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 405-09.
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dissonance avoidance and affect.26
The tendency of individuals to trust only those who share their orientation
makes the belief-generative power of culture feed on itself. If a particular
factual position starts out with even slightly more adherents than a competing
one, arguments in support of that position will necessarily predominate in
group discussions, making that position more likely to persuade.27 To gain the
approval of others in the group, moreover, members who even weakly support
what appears to be the dominant view are likely to express unequivocal support
for it, while those who disagree will tend to mute their opposition in order to
avoid censure. This form of “preference falsification”28 will in turn reinforce
the skewed distribution of arguments, making it even more likely that members
of the group will be persuaded that the dominant position is correct—indeed,
indisputably so.
The phenomenon of group polarization refers to the power of these
deliberative dynamics to generate homogeneous beliefs within insular groups.29
The same dynamics necessarily generate conflicting states of opinion across
insular groups that start out with even weakly opposed states of belief.30
Our theory of cultural cognition synthesizes these two bodies of research
and generalizes them. We propose that the various mechanisms of belief
formation identified by contemporary social psychology are likely to generate
risk perceptions skewed along cultural lines in the manner posited by Douglas
and Wildavsky. But we see nothing distinctive about attitudes toward
environmental protection in this regard. Criminal laws, economic regulation,
and public health policies all regulate activities that are ripe with culturally
infused social meanings. The same mechanisms of belief formation—from
cognitive dissonance avoidance to affect to biased assimilation to group
polarization—should thus induce individuals to conform their beliefs about the
empirical efficacy of such policies to their cultural evaluations. As a result,

26. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on
Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003); Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual
Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405, 415 (1995). We emphasize the understandable tendency of
ordinary individuals to substitute deference to their cultural peers for personal investigation when facts
are disputed. But the same tendency also characterizes the decisionmaking of individuals who are in a
position to investigate facts for themselves. Slovic, for example, shows that cultural orientation explains
variation in the attitudes of trained toxicologists on whether animal studies reliably generate conclusions
of carcinogen risk. SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 406-09.
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
89-90 (2000).
28. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1996).
29. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 90, 92.
30. See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelman, Modeling Facts, Culture, and
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. (forthcoming 2005), manuscript available at
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/modeling_cultural_cognition.pdf.
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seemingly empirical debates over all manner of public policy will be guided by
the invisible hands of conflicting cultural worldviews: hierarchic and
egalitarian, individualistic and solidaristic.
That in any case, is our theory. We turn next to our evidence.
III. CULTURAL COGNITION: EVIDENCE
There are various ways one might test the hypothesis that cultural
worldviews govern individuals’ beliefs about the efficacy of various policies.
One fairly straightforward way is to examine the correlations between cultural
worldviews and such beliefs. There is no reason to believe that empirical
information is unevenly distributed among hierarchists, egalitarians,
individualists and solidarists, or that persons of one or another orientation are
better able to understand such information. Accordingly, if there is a large
correlation between cultural worldviews and instrumental policy beliefs, and
that correlation persists even after controlling for other influences, then there is
strong reason to conclude that individuals are selectively attending to and
crediting empirical information depending on its congeniality to their
worldviews.
Numerous scholars have furnished exactly this sort of proof in connection
with environmental and technological risk perceptions. From environmental
pollution31 to nuclear power32 to genetically modified crops33 to ecological
management techniques34 to drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,35
hierarchists and individualists were predictably dismissive of risk claims, and
egalitarians predictably receptive toward them.
To test our hypothesis that the phenomenon of cultural cognition
generalizes to factual conflicts over public policies, we, along with John Gastil
and Paul Slovic, conducted our own study.36 The sample consisted of a broadly

31. See Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary
Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1991).
32. See Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Waste Images
of Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (James Flynn et al. eds., 2001); Claire Marris et al., A Quantitative Test of the
Cultural Theory of Risk Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm, 18 RISK ANALYSIS
635 (1998); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in
the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427 (1996).
33. See Melissa Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The “White Male” Effect, 2
HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159 (2000).
34. See Dipak Gyawali, Institutional Forces Behind Water Conflict in the Ganga Plains, 47
GEOJOURNAL 443 (1999); Wouter Poortinga et al., Environmental Risk Concern and Preferences for
Energy-Saving Measures, 34 ENV’T & BEHAV. 455 (2002); Linda Steg & Inge Sievers, Cultural Theory
and Individual Perceptions of Environmental Risks, 32 ENV’T & BEHAV. 250 (2000).
35. See Eric R.A.N. Smith et al., Trust During an Energy Crisis (Univ. Cal. Energy Inst. Energy
Policy & Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 006, 2003),
http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/Working_Papers/EPE_006.pdf.
36. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, National Risk & Culture Survey,
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representative, nationwide sample of 1800 individuals. Survey questions were
designed to determine the respondents’ cultural worldviews along the groupgrid dimensions as well as their factual beliefs about a wide range of policy
issues. We also collected information on pertinent demographic characteristics,
political attitudes, and personality traits that might plausibly explain variance in
such beliefs.
Our results furnished powerful confirmation of the generality of cultural
cognition. To begin, we were able to replicate the findings of other studies
investigating the influence of cultural worldviews on environmental and
technological risks. The more egalitarian and solidaristic individuals were, the
more concerned they were about global warming, nuclear power, and
environmental pollution generally; the more hierarchical and individualistic
they were, the less concerned they were about these asserted dangers. Indeed,
cultural worldviews predicted individual beliefs about the seriousness of these
risks more powerfully than any other factor, including gender, race, income,
education, and political ideology.37
Even more important, we found the same pattern for a wide range of other
instrumental policy beliefs. One set related to gun control. Gun-control
proponents argue that greater restrictions will promote public safety by
reducing gun violence and accidents,38 while gun-control opponents argue that
such restrictions will diminish public safety on net by rendering innocent
persons unable to defend themselves from violent criminals.39 We hypothesized
that individuals’ cultural worldviews would determine which of these empirical
claims they accept. Persons of hierarchical and individualistic orientations, we
surmised, would conclude that gun control has perverse consequences, a belief
congenial to the association of guns with hierarchical social roles (hunter,
protector, father) and with hierarchical and individualistic virtues (courage,
honor, chivalry, self-reliance, prowess). Relatively egalitarian and solidaristic
individuals, we anticipated, would believe that gun control enhances safety
because of their association of guns with patriarchy and racism, and with
distrust and indifference to the well-being of strangers.40 Our results again
strongly bore out these conclusions. Not only did cultural worldviews have the
predicted influence on beliefs, they also explained such beliefs more
powerfully than any other individual characteristic—including whether a
person was male or female, white or black, urban- or country-dwelling, liberal
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=45 (last visited
Nov. 10, 2005).
37. See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 3, at 16-18 & tbl.6.
38. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS (2000).
39. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUNCONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000).
40. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1299-1302 (2003).
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or conservative.41
We also established the impact of cultural worldviews on attitudes toward
the death penalty. Previous studies have found that beliefs in the deterrent
efficacy of the death penalty are highly correlated with evaluative, largely
symbolic attitudes toward it.42 We hypothesized that the “group-grid”
worldviews would capture these divisions. Hierarchists and individualists, we
anticipated, would believe in the efficacy of the death penalty, the former
because they see capital punishment as symbolic of deference to authority and
opposition to social deviance, and the latter because they see it as symbolic of
the law’s commitment to individual responsibility. Egalitarians and solidarists,
we predicted, would doubt the efficacy of capital punishment, the former
because of its association with racial inequality, and the latter because of its
perceived denigration of society’s responsibility to ameliorate the social
conditions that generate crime.43 Again, our results strongly confirmed these
hypotheses.44
Another set of beliefs concerned the impact of business regulation.
Unsurprisingly, egalitarians and solidarists perceived business regulation to be
conducive to economic prosperity, hierarchists and individualists destructive of
it.45
We also looked at a number of policy issues on which we expected
hierarchists to disagree with individualists, and egalitarians to disagree with
solidarists. One is drug criminalization. Hierarchists and solidarists, we
predicted, would see street drugs as a serious danger to the well-being of
society, the former because drugs are emblematic of deviancy, and the latter
because drug use is associated with irresponsibility and neglect of social
obligation. Because drug criminalization is likely to symbolize interference
with individual autonomy for individualists, and racism for egalitarians, we
surmised that persons of those persuasions would believe that street drugs are
relatively harmless for society. These predictions, too, were strongly supported
by our survey data.46
We also anticipated that hierarchists would square off against individualists

41. See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz supra note 3, at 19-21 & tbl.9.
42. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116 (1983); Barbara
Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 157
(1983); Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime,
or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 21 (1982).
43. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 439-42 (1999).
44. See John Gastil, Don Braman, Dan Kahan & Paul Slovic, The “Wildavsky Heuristic”: The
Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion 19-21 & tbls. 1-3 (Oct. 15, 2005) (unpublished article),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=834264.
45. See The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Culture and Political Attitudes,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
46. See id.
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and egalitarians on certain public health issues. These included the dangers to
society of promiscuous sexual behavior. Summoning “[t]he laws of nature . . .
to sanction the moral code,”47 hierarchists, we imagined, would see deviance of
this sort as dangerous and worthy of regulatory amelioration. But precisely
because restrictions on personal sexual behavior tend to connote patriarchal
norms, we expected egalitarians to view such behavior as relatively harmless.
We expected the same would be true of individualists, for whom regulation of
sexual behavior is symbolic of societal interference with individual
prerogatives generally. Beliefs among our respondents turned out to be
distributed in exactly this pattern.48
We also studied beliefs about the health impact of abortion. In her classic
study, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, Kristin Luker depicted the
abortion controversy as a conflict between persons who subscribe to
hierarchical norms, which confer status upon women who occupy domestic
roles, and persons who subscribe to egalitarian and individualist norms, which
confer status upon women and men alike for success in civil society.49
Consistent with this account, the phenomenon of cultural cognition implies that
hierarchical women should see abortion as not just morally wrong but
dangerous to the health of women, a belief that individualist and egalitarian
women should emphatically reject. This turns out to be true as well, even after
various other influences—including religion and ideology, race and class—are
taken into account.50
However divided Americans might be on the nature of an ideal society,
there is widespread consensus that securing the material well-being of citizens
is a proper object of law. Accordingly, reframing culturally fraught issues in
purely consequentialist terms—ones that avoid explicitly siding with any
partisan vision of the good—is a familiar impulse for those intent on dissipating
conflict.51
The phenomenon of cultural cognition, however, explains why this strategy
so often fails. Even when citizens of diverse worldviews agree that
environmental, criminal, economic, and public health policies should all be
judged by a purely consequentialist standard, their worldviews prevent them
from agreeing about which policies have the best consequences.

47. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 3.
48. See The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, Culture and Political Attitudes,
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
49. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
50. See Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz, supra note 3, at 23-24 & tbl.12.
51. See Kahan, supra note 43, at 432-35, 445-48; Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The
Dangers of “Strong” Causal Reasoning in Social Policy, 36 SOCIETY 38, 39-40 (1999).
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IV. CULTURAL COGNITION, CULTURE WARS, AND THE END OF IDEOLOGY
The role of culture in politics is a topic of immense current interest. In
sponsoring a host of state referenda to ban gay marriage and announcing its
support for a federal constitutional amendment to do the same, the Bush
campaign sought to mobilize its conservative base by pushing cultural issues to
the forefront in the 2004 presidential election.52 Commentators continue to
debate how large a role this strategy played in securing Bush’s victory, and
what the outcome of the 2004 presidential race signifies about the importance
of cultural values in American politics generally.53 The phenomenon of cultural
cognition suggests distinctive answers to these questions.54
Two positions dominate the academic debate over cultural conflict in
American politics. The “culture war” thesis asserts that such conflict is of
decisive importance. The prominence of symbolic issues like gay marriage,
abortion, capital punishment, and gun control reflects the struggle of opposing
cultural groups to impose a moral orthodoxy through law.55 On this view,
“culture outweighs economics as a matter of public concern.”56 Indeed, it is by
deftly aligning themselves with the cultural values of lower middle class
Americans that Republicans manage to win the support of this constituency
notwithstanding the party’s support for economic policies that are clearly
inimical to the interests of these voters.57
The “end of ideology” thesis, in contrast, treats the appearance of cultural
conflict in American politics as largely an illusion. “The simple truth,” writes
Morris Fiorina, “is that there is no culture war in the United States—no battle
for the soul of America rages, at least none that most Americans are aware
of.”58 The vast majority of voters hold relatively moderate views on contested
cultural issues. What’s more, the views they hold are not particularly intense;
the performance of the economy and other matters that affect their material
welfare are their main focus.59 The position of the major parties on cultural
52. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, “Moral Values” Carried Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2004, at A20.
53. See, e.g., Symposium, Culture War in America: Myth or Reality?, 3 FORUM: J. APPLIED RES.
CONTEMP. POL. (2005), http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss2/.
54. Gastil, Braman, Kahan & Slovic, supra note 44, at 27-28.
55. See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991).
56. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? 6 (2004)
57. See generally id. (developing this thesis to explain the appeal of the Republican Party in
economically disadvantaged regions of the United States).
58. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 7-8 (2005).
59. Many news media outlets identified “moral values” as the primary concern of voters in the
2004 election. However, a Pew Research Center poll of 1209 such voters found that the disposition of
voters to identify moral values as the most important factor in their decision was extremely sensitive to
question wording, and that in fact 57% of voters identified either “Iraq” (22%), “Economy/Jobs” (21%),
or “Terrorism” (14%) as the most important factor when those choices were offered as alternatives to
“moral values” (27%). See Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Voters Liked Campaign 2004,
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issues is of consequence to only a relatively small group of intensely partisan
and highly sophisticated voters. The concerns of these more zealous
constituencies assume a misleadingly central appearance in electoral politics as
a whole only because such groups are disproportionately vocal, and because the
material-minded, non-ideological masses are evenly split in their party
allegiances.60
The phenomenon of cultural cognition suggests that both of these positions
are wrong. The “end of ideology” thesis grossly understates the role that culture
plays in organizing mass, and not just fringe, political opinion in the United
States. But the “culture war” thesis just as decisively misunderstands the way in
which cultural values figure in mass politics.
To make these points concrete, is useful to start with a broader puzzle in
political science: How do ordinary citizens form their political opinions?61 For
most citizens, the intricacies of national policy are far less important, and
occupy far less of their time, than the day-to-day goings on of their jobs, the
details of their social and family lives, and even the current performance of
their local professional sports teams.62 Not surprisingly, a considerable body of
political science research shows that neither party affiliation nor ideology
predict mass opinion very well; those characteristics are strong predictors only
for highly sophisticated individuals who devote relatively large amounts of
time to collecting information on political issues.63 These findings are in fact
central to the case of those who espouse the “end of ideology” thesis. But it’s
clearly not the case that policy positions and candidate preferences are
randomly distributed across the mass of citizens. If ideology and party
affiliation aren’t imposing a coherent shape on mass opinion, what is?
The answer, we suggest, is cultural cognition. Here we draw again on
Wildavsky, who hypothesized that “group-grid” worldviews are substantially
more productive fonts of mass opinion than conventional political ideologies.64
Most citizens, he recognized, don’t have the capacity to derive concrete
positions from the abstractions comprised by “liberalism” and
“conservativism.” Nor do they have the time to identify, and attend to the
leadership of, more politically sophisticated and ideologically attuned elites.
But most citizens do have a vivid sense of the values that inhere in hierarchy,

but Too Much “Mud-Slinging,” Nov. 11, 2004, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=233.
60. FIORINA, supra note 58, at 37-38, 114.
61. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 15-16 (1991).
62. See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 6-7, 16 (1992).
63. See id. 84-89; MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 254-61 (1996).
64. See Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of
Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1987).
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egalitarianism, individualism and solidarism, which are woven into ordinary
citizens’ everyday life activities. It often will be possible, Wildavsky argued,
for citizens to chart which policy positions cohere with, and which candidates
adhere to, their cultural worldviews. But even more important, worldviews
furnish ordinary citizens with a surfeit of readily accessible cues to guide their
political preferences: the advice of culturally like-minded associates, the
directives of leadership figures clearly invested with cultural authority, the line
espoused by culturally-affiliated organs of mass opinion. In effect, worldviewcongeniality operates as a powerful heuristic for identifying which positions to
espouse or denounce, and which candidates to endorse or oppose.65
The data from our cultural worldview study again furnishes support for this
position. Our cultural worldview scales were much stronger predictors of
opinions on environmental issues, crime control issues, and economic
regulatory issues than were ideological and party affiliation measures. In fact,
on most of these matters—consistent with existing political science literature—
ideology and party affiliation predicted the opinion only of respondents who
possessed a relatively high degree of political sophistication. In contrast,
cultural worldviews were able to predict policy positions for all respondents,
including the most politically unsophisticated ones.66 Consistent with
Wildavsky’s hypothesis, cultural worldview does indeed appear to systematize
political opinions for the mass of citizens.
This conclusion spells trouble for the “end of ideology” thesis. Cultural
values clearly do generate major divisions of opinion on a range of issues—not
just among partisans or elites, but also among moderate citizens of meager
political sophistication. The “end of ideology” thesis relies heavily on evidence
that the vast majority of citizens are not strongly ideological in their opinions.
But that just shows that the ideologies, as conventionally measured, are a bad
proxy for cultural worldviews, not that cultural worldviews are politically inert.
At the same time, cultural cognition does little to vindicate the “culture
war” thesis. That position sees American politics as dominated by illiberal
jockeying among opposing cultural groups bent on capturing the expressive
capital of law. Nothing in the cultural cognition theory entails that picture of
American politics. Instead, the phenomenon of cultural cognition explains how
citizens whose only concern is their material well-being, narrowly understood,
are still likely to array themselves into opposing cultural factions on political
maters. Again, citizens aren’t in a position to figure out for themselves what
economic, crime-control, environmental or national security policies advance
their material interests. Accordingly, citizens must defer to the opinion of
persons whom they believe are knowledgeable and share their interests to tell

65. See id. at 6-13.
66. Gastil, Braman, Kahan & Slovic, supra note 44, at 20-21 & tbl.4.
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them which policies and candidates to support.67 And the persons to whom
citizens attribute these attributes, unsurprisingly, are the ones who share their
cultural worldviews, and who, as a result of the various mechanisms of cultural
cognition, are likely to be slanted toward one particular policy position or
candidate.
In sum, cultural values don’t motivate mass political opinion, as the
“culture war” thesis imagines. They merely orient it through a complex set of
interrelated social and cognitive mechanisms. The paradoxical result is the
cultural polarization of even relatively nonpartisan and tolerant citizens whose
most pressing political concern is to identify which policies and which party
will best help them make ends meet.
So did Bush win in 2004 because he was the candidate who shared most
citizens’ cultural values or because he was the candidate whom citizens thought
would best promote their material interests? The answer is both: The vast
majority of citizens who voted for Bush perceived that doing so would advance
their interests; and they believed this because they imputed competence, shared
interest, and trustworthiness to Bush as a result of his (and the Republican
Party’s) stances on cultural issues. Yet insofar as cultural values only orient
rather than motivate citizens, most of his supporters probably won’t care if
Bush now pushes culture to the back burner (as he already has on gay
marriage),68 and attends only to economics and national securityso long as
those policies also cohere with his supporters’ cultural worldviews.
V. FROM HEURISTIC TO BIAS
Public disagreement about the consequences of law is not just a puzzle to
be explained but a problem to be solved. The prospects for enlightened
democratic decisionmaking obviously depend on some reliable mechanism for
resolving such disputes and resolving them accurately. Because such
disagreements turn on empirical claims that admit of scientific investigation,
the conventional prescription is the pursuit and dissemination of scientifically
sound information.69

67. See Arthur Lupia, Who Can Persuade Whom? Implications from the Nexus of Psychology and
Rational Choice Theory, in THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 51 (James H. Kuklinski ed.,
2002).
68. Jim VandeHei & Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Says Election Ratified Iraq Policy, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 2005, at A1 (“Bush said he will not press senators to pass a constitutional amendment banning
same-sex marriage, the top priority for many social conservative groups.”).
69. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1296 (2003) (“Over time, a body of empirical research can
disentangle thorny issues of causation and lead toward consensus.”); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig,
Fact-Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1337 (2003) (“[C]ulture clearly matters for public
opinion about gun policy in America, but there is also room for empirical analysis to affect policy
development, not only through its influence on public opinion, but also through its direct influence on
judges, regulatory agencies, and legislators.”).
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The hope that democracy can be enlightened in such a straightforward
manner, however, turns out to be an idle one. Like most heuristics, cultural
cognition is also a bias. By virtue of the power that cultural cognition exerts
over belief formation, public dispute can be expected to persist on questions
like the deterrent effect of capital punishment, the danger posed by global
warming, the utility or futility of gun control, and the like, even after the truth
of the matter has been conclusively established.
Imagine—very counterfactually70—that all citizens are perfect Bayesians.
That is, whenever they are apprised of reliable information, they readily update
their prior factual beliefs in a manner that appropriately integrates this new
information with all existing information at their disposal.71 Even under these
circumstances, conclusive discovery of the truth is no guarantee that citizens
will converge on true beliefs about the consequences of contested public
policies. For while Bayesianism tells individuals what to do with relevant and
reliable information, it doesn’t tell them when they should regard information
as relevant and reliable. Individuals can be expected to give dispositive
empirical information the weight that it is due in a rational-decisionmaking
calculus only if they recognize sound information when they see it.
The phenomenon of cultural cognition suggests they won’t. The same
psychological and social processes that induce individuals to form factual
beliefs consistent with their cultural orientation will also prevent them from
perceiving contrary empirical data to be credible. Cognitive-dissonance
avoidance will steel individuals to resist empirical data that either threatens
practices they revere or bolsters ones they despise, particularly when accepting
such data would force them to disagree with individuals they respect. The
cultural judgments embedded in affect will speak more authoritatively than
contrary data as individuals gauge what practices are dangerous and what
practices are not. And the culturally partisan foundation of trust will make them
dismiss contrary data as unreliable if they perceive that it originates from
persons who don’t harbor their own cultural commitments.
This picture is borne out by additional well-established psychological and
social mechanisms. One constraint on the disposition of individuals to accept
empirical evidence that contradicts their culturally conditioned beliefs is the
phenomenon of biased assimilation.72 This phenomenon refers to the tendency
of individuals to condition their acceptance of new information as reliable
based on its conformity to their prior beliefs. This disposition to reject
70. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982) (documenting numerous departures from rationality in human decisionmaking).
71. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968) (developing the Bayesian model
for how to integrate information and probabilistic judgments in making decisions under conditions of
uncertainty).
72. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
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empirical data that contradict one’s prior belief (for example, that the death
penalty does or doesn’t deter crime) is likely to be especially pronounced when
that belief is strongly connected to an individual’s cultural identity, for then the
forces of cognitive dissonance avoidance that explain biased assimilation are
likely to be most strongly aroused.73
Two additional mechanisms reinforce the tendency to see new information
as unreliable when it challenges a culturally congenial belief. The first is naïve
realism. This phenomenon refers to the disposition of individuals to view the
factual beliefs that predominate in their own cultural group as the product of
“objective” assessment, and to attribute the contrary factual beliefs of their
cultural and ideological adversaries to the biasing influence of their
worldviews. Under these conditions, evidence of the truth will never travel
across the boundary line that separates a factually enlightened cultural group
from a factually benighted one. Indeed, far from being admitted entry, the truth
will be held up at the border precisely because it originates from an alien
cultural destination. The second mechanism that constrains societal
transmission of truth—reactive devaluation—is the tendency of individuals
who belong to a group to dismiss the persuasiveness of evidence proffered by
their adversaries in settings of intergroup conflict.74
We have been focusing on the impact of cultural cognition as a bias in the
public’s recognition of empirically sound information. But it would be a
mistake to infer that the immunity of social and natural scientists to such bias
improves the prospects for truth, once discovered, to penetrate public debate.
This would be a mistake, first, because scientists aren’t immune to the
dynamics we have identified.75 Like everyone else, scientists (quite
understandably, even rationally) rely heavily on their priors when evaluating
the reliability of new information. In one ingenious study, for example,
scientists were asked to judge the experimental and statistical methods of what
was represented to be a real study of the phenomenon of ESP. Those who
received the version of the fictitious study that found evidence of ESP rated the
methods to be low in quality, whereas those who received the version that
found no evidence of ESP rated the methods to be high in quality, even though
the methods were in fact independent of the conclusion.76 Other studies
showing that cultural worldviews explain variance in risk perceptions not just

73. See id. at 2108 (“If our study demonstrates anything, it surely demonstrates that social scientists
can not expect rationality, enlightenment, and consensus about policy to emerge from their attempts to
furnish ‘objective’ data about burning social issues.”).
74. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
75. See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 259 (1998).
76. See Jonathan J. Kohler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments, 56 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993).
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among lay persons but also among scientists who specialize in risk evaluation77
fortify the conclusion that for scientists, too, cultural cognition operates as an
information-processing filter.
But second and more important, any special resistance scientists might have
to the biasing effect of cultural cognition is beside the point. The issue is
whether the discovery and dissemination of empirically sound information can,
on its own, be expected to protect democratic policymaking from the distorting
effect of culturally polarized beliefs among citizens and their representatives.
Again (for the umpteenth time), ordinary citizens aren’t in a position to
determine for themselves whether this or that scientific study of the impact of
gun control laws, of the deterrent effect of the death penalty, of the threat posed
by global warming, et cetera, is sound. Scientific consensus, when it exists,
determines beliefs in society at large only by virtue of social norms and
practices that endow scientists with deference-compelling authority on the
issues to which they speak. When they address matters that have no particular
cultural valence within the group-grid matrix—What are the relative waterrepellant qualities of different synthetic fabrics? Has Fermat’s Last Theorem
been solved?—the operation of these norms and practices is unremarkable and
essentially invisible.
But when scientists speak to policy issues that are culturally disputed, then
their truth-certifying credentials are necessarily put on trial. For many citizens,
men and women in white lab coats speak with less authority than (mostly) men
and women in black frocks. And even those who believe the scientists will still
have to choose which scientists to believe. The laws of probability, not to
mention the professional incentives toward contrarianism,78 assure that even in
the face of widespread professional consensus there will be outliers.79 Citizens
(again!) lack the capacity to decide for themselves whose work has more merit.
They have no choice but to defer to those whom they trust to tell them which
scientists to believe. And the people they trust are inevitably the ones whose
cultural values they share, and who are inclined to credit or dismiss scientific
evidence based on its conformity to their cultural priors.
These arguments are necessarily interpretative and conjectural.80 But in the
spirit of (casual) empirical verification, we invite those who are skeptical to
perform this thought experiment. Ask yourself whether you think there is any
credible scientific ground for believing that global warming is/isn’t a serious
threat; that the death penalty does/doesn’t deter; that gun control does/doesn’t

77. See, e.g., SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 406.
78. See ROBERT K. MERTON, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
283-324 (1973).
79. See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 10, at 49-66.
80. They are developed more systematically, with the aid of computer simulations, in Braman,
Kahan & Grimmelman, supra note 30.
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reduce violent crime; that abortion is/isn’t safer than childbirth. If you believe
the truth has been established on any one of these issues, ask yourself why it
hasn’t dispelled public disagreement. If you catch yourself speculating about
the possible hidden cognitive motivations the disbelievers might have by virtue
of their cultural commitments, you may proceed to the next Part of this Essay
(although not until you’ve reflected on why you think you know the truth and
whether your cultural commitments might have anything to do with that
belief).81 If, in contrast, you are tempted to answer, “Because the information
isn’t accessible to members of the public,” then please go back to the beginning
of this Essay and start over.
VI. OVERCOMING CULTURAL BIAS: IDENTITY AFFIRMATION
Nothing in our account implies either that there is no truth of the matter on
disputed empirical policy issues or that the public cannot be made receptive to
that truth. Like at least some other cognitive biases, cultural cognition can be
counteracted.
As we’ve argued, factual disputes over gun control, the death penalty,
environmental regulation and like issues derive from individuals’ resistance to
accepting information that threatens their cultural commitments. It follows that
individuals are likely to resist factual information less if it can be presented in
forms that affirm rather than denigrate their values. Experimental research
shows that where individuals feel self-affirmed they are indeed more open to
reconsidering their beliefs on culturally contested issues, including the death
penalty and abortion.82 Policymakers can harness this identity-affirmation
effect by designing policies that are sufficiently rich in their social meanings to
affirm the values of persons of diverse cultural worldviews simultaneously.
Consider two historical examples. The first concerns the success of abortion
reform in France. Decades-long conflict on that issue was quieted by a policy
that conditioned abortion on an unreviewable certification of personal
“distress.”83 That policy made it possible for both religious traditionalists, who
interpreted certification as symbolizing the sanctity of life, and egalitarians and
individualists, who interpreted unreviewability as affirming the autonomy of
women, to see their commitments affirmed by the law.84

81. Cf. Robinson et al., supra note 26, at 405 (suggesting that individuals more readily recognize
rationalization and group influence on beliefs of others than on their own beliefs).
82. See Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by
Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 (2000); Sherman & Cohen, supra
note 23; Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological
Closed-Mindedness
and
Inflexibility
(Oct.
16,
2005)
(unpublished
article),
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/cohen_self_affirmation_draft.pdf.
83. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 15 (1987).
84. See id. at 15-20; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 63-64 (1993).
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Thereafter, France enacted a set of policies involving counseling and
enhanced social support for single mothers, measures that in fact reduce the
abortion rate.85 The evidence that such policies would work in exactly this way
existed before adoption of France’s abortion reform law. But it was not until
after the law succeeded in achieving a measure of expressive convergence that
the two sides trusted one another to believe the evidence and give this
consequentialist solution a try.86
The second example concerns the emergence of political consensus in favor
of tradeable emissions permits as a means of regulating air pollution in the late
1980s and early 1990s.87 Because such permits involve a market mechanism for
controlling pollution, this regulatory strategy vindicated individualists’ belief
that private orderings conduce to societal well-being. Hierarchists could also
feel affirmed by a policy that promised to empower rather than constrain
powerful commercial firms. Shown a solution that affirmed rather than
threatened their identities, it thus became easier for persons of these
persuasions to accept that air pollution was a problem to begin with. At the
same time, because this policy was aimed at improving air quality, egalitarians
and solidarists could see its adoption as recognizing their view of the dangers
of unconstrained commerce and industry. The affirmation of their values thus
made it easier for them to accept evidence that uniform, centrally enforced air
quality standards don’t work.88
Now consider two prospective applications of identity affirmation for
neutralizing cultural bias. Recently, certain ideologically diverse groups have
started to tout renewed investment in nuclear power as a way to reduce the
greenhouse gas emissions primarily responsible for global warming.89 The selfaffirmation effect suggests why this proposal might actually change minds,
both about the dangers of global climate change and about the risks of nuclear
energy. Individualists and hierarchists both support nuclear power, which is
emblematic of the very cultural values that are threatened by society’s
recognition of the global warming threat. Shown a solution that affirms their
identities, individualists and hierarchists, as in the case of tradeable emission
permits, can be expected to display less resistance—not just politically, but
cognitively—to the proposition that global warming is a problem after all.
85. See GLENDON, supra note 83, at 18, 53-55.
86. See id.
87. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM
13-30 (2000) (recounting emergence of consensus in response to efforts of the first Bush Administration
to deflect charges of insufficient commitment to the environment).
88. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE
CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
89. See Craig Gilbert, Vice President Calls for Support of Nuclear Power Plants as Way to Reduce
Global Warming, MILWAUKEE J.-SENT., June 14, 2001, at 16A; Nicholas D. Kristof, Nukes Are Green,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, at A19.
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Likewise, when egalitarians and solidarists are exposed to the same
information, they are likely to perceive nuclear power to be less dangerous: The
affirmation of their identity associated with the recognition of global warming
threat lowers the cultural status cost of accepting information about nuclear
safety that they have long resisted.
A second of use of identity affirmation involves gun control. We propose
that states offer a “bounty,” in the form of a tax rebate or other monetary
reward, for individuals who register handguns. A bounty of this sort would
affirm the cultural identities of both gun-control supporters and gun-control
opponents simultaneously because both could see it as an effective and fair
solution to a collective action problem—even without agreeing what that
problem is! For gun-control supporters, the relevant collective good is public
safety, which registration promotes by making it easier to trace the ownership
of weapons used to commit crimes. In line with egalitarian and solidarist
sensibilities, control supporters can thus envision the bounty as a means of
equitably compensating individuals for contributing to society’s collective
welfare. For gun-control opponents, in contrast, the relevant public good is the
reduction of violent crime in a community in which a relatively high proportion
of individuals own guns. Because they don’t believe individuals should be
expected to endure disproportionate burdens to benefit society at large,
individualists will think it’s perfectly appropriate to compensate individual gun
owners for the contribution they are making to public safety generally. So will
hierarchists, who can see the bounty as a fitting public acknowledgement of the
virtuous willingness of gun owners to promote the common good.90
Again, the benefit of such a policy consists less in the effect it has on risky
behavior than the impact it has in removing cultural impediments to the
acceptance of facts about risk. Any policy that affirms the identities of
culturally diverse citizens simultaneously should make all of them more
receptive to information that they might otherwise have found to be lacking in
credibility. We don’t know (be honest: do you?) whether more guns lead to
more crime or less. But we are certain that members of the American public
won’t converge on the truth of the matter on this or other culturally contested
issues unless policymakers succeed in framing their proposals in terms
congenial to citizens of diverse cultural persuasions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we have attempted to solve a puzzle: What explains public
90. For an elaboration of this proposal and others aimed at resolving the cultural impasse over guns
in American society, see Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of
Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 54 EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2006), manuscript available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/
Overcoming_fear_cultural_politics.pdf.
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disagreement over the consequences of law? The answer, we have suggested,
has less to do with differences in knowledge than differences in values. The
phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to a series of interlocking social and
psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to conform their factual
beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the activities
subject to regulation. As a result, individuals of diverse cultural worldviews
form highly divergent factual beliefs about which policies will ameliorate
sources of societal distress and which will merely compound them. Moreover,
because cultural cognition determines what sorts of information individuals
find reliable, culturally polarized beliefs of this sort stubbornly persist in the
face of scientific advances in understanding.
This solution to the puzzle of empirical policy disagreement generates a
paradox. The prospects for democracy are obviously dim among a society of
individuals zealously intent on securing political endorsement of their own
partisan view of the good. But it turns out that the prospects are not inestimably
brighter in a society whose members’ only political concern is to secure their
collective material well-being. For even if such individuals renounce the
ambition to impose their own worldviews on one another, their conflicting
values will continue to drive them into persistent and bitter opposition as they
attend in common to their most mundane needs.
This paradox gives rise to a dilemma. If the alliance of modern science and
liberal political ideals can’t assure effective and pluralistic self-government,
what can?
Our prescription, counterintuitively, is a more unabashedly cultural style of
democratic policymaking. Those interested in helping citizens to converge in
support of empirically sound policies—on guns, on the environment, on crime
control, on national security—should focus less on facts and more on social
meaning. It’s only when they perceive that a policy bears a social meaning
congenial to their cultural values that citizens become receptive to sound
empirical evidence about what consequences that policy will have. It’s
therefore essential to devise policies that can bear acceptable social meanings
to citizens of diverse cultural persuasions simultaneously. Because culture is
cognitive prior to facts in the policy disputes, culture must be politically prior
to facts too.
While the strategies we’ve described for counteracting cultural cognition as
bias are based on the best research available, our account of how to work
through rather than against cultural cognition is admittedly ad hoc. The
psychological mechanisms that we’ve described merit more detailed
evaluation, and the counter-biasing strategies we’ve advanced call for
additional empirical testing in both the lab and the field. But we believe that
what we’ve already discovered about the relationship between cultural values
and political preferences makes one conclusion abundantly clear: that
169

CULTURAL COGNITION 9 (EE REVIEW COMPLETE).DOC

Yale Law & Policy Review

11/14/2005 2:51 PM

Vol. 24:147, 2006

democracy needs scientific knowledge of what laws say every bit as much as it
needs scientific knowledge of what laws do.
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